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Sylvain Lazarus, a theorist, anthropologist and political activist, is well
known in French circles, but is not so well known in English-speaking
ones. Lately, more attention is being paid to him because Alain Badiou,
whose work is becoming better known around the world, has referred
often to Lazarus’ work as deeply influential, especially concerning
Badiou’s political work and his theory of  naming developed in Logiques
des mondes. Both Badiou and Lazarus assert that we must move away
from thinking politics as a kind of  managing of  political problems.
The “cash-value” and “short-term solution” pragmatic approach to
politics, e.g., as advocated by Richard Rorty, fails to think politics. It
simply provides solutions to everyday problems, but it fails to take into
consideration the very system or political conditions that make such
day to day affairs possible, namely, political events (Badiou) or modes
of  political thinking (Lazarus).
Generally, Lazarus is central for an understanding of  what it
is to think politics, especially as it relates to time. Lazarus, like Badiou,
argues that politics is not only about action and events but also includes
thought. Politics is a form of  thought—and philosophy can and must
think politics. As it turns out, both thinkers maintain that the
contemporary penury in politics is most evident in the fact that there is
little thought about politics. Rather, there is always an emphasis on
managing the affairs of  the state, on expedient political decision-making,
and on what has traditionally been called political economy. Implicit in
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these acts is a political philosophy based on capitalism and globalization,
all postulated on a liberal philosophy of  the individual with its emphasis
on private property and wealth. This philosophy, however, remains
unquestioned and its implications insufficiently mined.
Badiou and Lazarus try to think about what politics is. For
Lazarus, employing what he calls an anthropology of  the name
(l’anthropologie du nom), thinking itself  is the locus of  politics. For Badiou,
thinking through the constitutive elements of  the political event and
their ordering in time in fidelity (ordination temporelle) yields a philosophy
of  politics or a meta-politics. Hence, one of  the major differences
between Badiou and Lazarus is that the latter believes that we can
abolish the category of  time in thinking politics, whereas the former
maintains that time is coeval with both the event and thinking of  politics.
What I wish to argue here is that Lazarus’s position does admit
temporality in that it implies an internal sequencing in thought. Lazarus’
thinking about politics as a kind of  internal sequencing, therefore, can
be seen to run parallel to Badiou’s notion of  fidelity as a temporal
ordering in thought (understood through retrospective apprehension).
Eliminating the Category of  Time and the Name of  Politics
Lazarus starts with a given, namely, there is thought—il y a de
la pensée.1 He notes that thinking understood within the rubric of
“intellectualities” (i.e., les intellectualités or things thought) means that
thinking is inherently multiple. There is a multiplicity of  intellectualities.
This derives from the fact that there are people who think. Les gens
pensent. There are many people who think, and intellectualities thought
by many people can be inherently multiple. Each of  these intellectualities,
though, is singular.2 Furthermore, Lazarus wishes to draw a distinction
between unity and singularity. Unity for Lazarus is an operation of
defining or identifying an intellectuality with one fixed meaning. When
people think this one intellectuality, they think it identically and in the
same way semper et ubicumque. But for Lazarus, a multiplicity of  thinkers
ensures that thought is not identical. By claiming that a multiplicity of
intellectualities does not necessarily lapse into a unity, Lazarus wishes
to avoid the legacy of  les grands récits of  unity that have dominated
traditional Western metaphysics. Moreover, there is nothing in this
multiplicity to suggest that there is such a thing as a unity.  There is,
however, within each multiple intellectuality a singularity or uniqueness
that does not make each singularity reducible to another. Singularity,
therefore, can be seen as a principle of  individuation that separates
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one thought from another, giving to each singularity its own unicity or
uniqueness. A thought can have multiple contents, definitions or names,
yet each of  these is singular or unique. Thinking can become singular
in this way because thinking articulates the unique, individuated content
of  the thought. This is why Lazarus describes thought as an indistinct
certain. It is indistinct in that it is multiple and unnameable, that is, not
absolutely definable. There is, however, also a certainty that stems from
the singularity contained within each multiple thought. Though not
absolutely unified, intellectual singularities can be thought consistently
in that they are given to us or localized in a certain sequence or we can
arrange them in such a sequence.3 As Lazarus remarks, “La pensée est
pensable.”4 We shall see how this plays out when we examine the historical
mode of thought.
In order to think through the content of  thought, Lazarus
believes we must employ what he calls an anthropology of  the name
(l’anthropologie du nom) or a nominal anthropology. We can name, and
therefore communicate, the singular contents of  thought,
simultaneously thinking through their implications, especially if  we
establish and arrange the contents of  our intellectualities in diverse
ways. In order to carry out such an arrangement or ordering we have to
abolish the category of  time, which is understood as an objectively
historical sequencing of  events. The shift here is a move away from a
supposedly “scientific” establishing of  an order of  events, moving more
toward an internal or purely subjective way of  thinking about certain,
distinct events as the mode of  politics they reveal. It should be remarked
here that Badiou speaks of  an ordering or fidelity to events, but his
order is temporal, whereas Lazarus’ is non-temporal. Lazarus calls for
an internal thinking of  the subjective that does not temporalize or
even subjectivate as is the case with Badiou’s subjectivity. Each subjective
intervention that causes an event for Badiou is temporalizing.
Let us try to give an example of  how a Lazarusian nominal
anthropology functions. First, we turn to a summary definition of  what
a nominal anthropology is:
Le caractère anthropologique de mon propos se joue sur la question
du nom innomable. Le nom est innomable parce que c’est celui d’une
singularité irréductible à autre chose qu’à elle même, tandis que toute
nomination ouvre à une généralisation, à une typologie, ou à une
polysémie manifestant l’existence d’une multiplicité hétérogène, qui
dénient la singularité. La proposition est donc que le nom existe;
entendons la singularité existe, mais on ne peut pas la nommer,
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seulement la saisir par ce qu’on verra être ses lieux. La pensée
délivre des noms qui sont innomables mais qui peuvent être saisis
par leurs lieux. Dans la formule “anthropologie du nom”, le nom
désigne en définitive la volonté d’appréhender la singularité sans la
faire disparaître.5
We will use the example of  May ‘68 in France. May ‘68 is intellectual
because it is a thought that we experience in our interiority (il a lieu) and
it is singular because it is not reducible to any other event in human
history. Interiority is the primary, internal locus of  human thought.
Also, May ‘68 took place only once at a certain point in France. Il a eu
lieu. It can be thought in two modes: historically and intellectually. It
has a certain beginning and a certain end as an historical sequence of
events. All historical events for Lazarus are marked by a certain temporal
sequencing. They have a certain beginning and there is a certain lapsing
(péremption). May ‘68 is not now in the sense that its singularity is not
identical or reducible to the political events of  May 2008.6 But at the
same time that we can name this event as May ‘68, it remains unnameable
because the event is subject to an internal, subjective sequencing that
can make thinkable additional various ideas, thoughts, and even more
sequencing and orderings. Unnameable means that an intellectual
singularity cannot be defined or thought absolutely, like certain streams
of  philosophy and history claim, as having only certain fixed names or
definitions and no other possible ones. Rather, definitions compete as
they refer to different prescriptions on what exists.7 So long as multiplicity
endures as a multiplicity, it keeps multiplying. This multiplication means
that thought or intellectualities will continue to accrue. To name
something absolutely is to fix its identity, which would ultimately stymie
the flow of  multiplicity.  Hence, though May ‘68 is a singular event that
we can name, we can never fix and delimit its definitions. The new
contents, names or definitions that emerge may give to May ‘68 new
and additional synonymous names. For example, Badiou and Lazarus
may name May ‘68 a pivotal and significant moment in French history,
but Lyotard8 and Ferry9 may call May ‘68 a failure. Badiou sees in ‘68 an
event that made politics concretely possible, and Lazarus sees it as an
intellectual singularity that made political thought possible. But Lyotard
criticizes the arrogant grand narrative of  the intellectuals, and Ferry
points to the lack of  enduring evidence of  any real dramatic change.
For Ferry, May ‘68 was more self-serving for certain French intellectuals
than revolutionary.
In other words, for Lazarus we can never define or fix one
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meaning to May ‘68, for it will have a plethora of  meanings for those
who experienced May ‘68, depending upon which side they found
themselves on during the various uprisings, etc. Also, as history unfolds,
the events will take on new contents or definitions because of  the
development of  new events that impact our understanding of  May
‘68. It is the loci of  May ‘68 (i.e., the streets, universities and factories)
that give us the means to identify or name a sequence of  events “May
‘68”. Historically, there are certain sequences of  events that have
happened and intellectually we can will to think about these events.
They can also occupy a place within our subjective interiorities. When
we try to think of  the name “politics” that emerges from the singular
event “May ‘68”, various categories will also emerge. Such categories
include: revolutionary politics, terror, subversive politics, civil
disobedience, and a politics of  violence. These categories are the
generalizations that emerge when we think about politics operating,
and because they can contain so many diverse contents and definitions,
they are not absolutely definable or nameable; rather, as was said
previously, various definitions compete because the possibility of  adding
new definitions and contents exists, intellectual singularities resist having
fixed names. They are unnameable insofar as they have to leave room
for potential new definitions and contents to emerge. Yet, they can be
pointed to and named when we think the historical or intellectual events
that culminated in May ‘68. The uniquely anthropological character of
Lazarus’ project lies in the fact that he wishes to ground his project
within the interiority of the human subject, a subject that is itself an
indistinct certain.
For Lazarus, categories can be named and identified but they
cannot be absolutely defined. A category is defined by Lazarus as the
way an intellectual singularity operates. This categorical way of  operating
is called a mode.10 Something in a singularity can be categorized or
thought of  as belonging to that singularity. That which singularizes a
singularity operates or functions in a peculiar way; it has a mode of
operating. For example, the French Revolution (1792-1794) for Lazarus,
thought as an intellectual singularity, operates in many ways. Each way
is unique and is a category belonging to the French Revolution. As we
shall see later, thinking about the French Revolution and how it operates
allow us to think in a singular way about a revolutionary mode of
politics.
At this point, it would be useful to comment on the notion of
“name” in Lazarus’ thought. When someone thinks the name “politics”,
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politics is a singular intellectuality, that is, it is a thought. Lazarus does
not use the term “object” of  thought because he wishes to avoid the
legacy of  essentializing or objectivizing notions of  thought, thereby
focusing on thought as an anthropological undertaking. One way politics
can be thought is historically, and it is this that is most relevant for our
project because it is here that the category of  time emerges and is
eventually abolished by Lazarus.11
A name identifies that which is thought in thought. A name is
not given directly or by itself. A name comes to be given through the
category of  place or site. In other words, a name comes to be through
a certain locus (le nom a lieu) or a having taken place (le nom a eu lieu). To
say the name has a place is to say that it is localized in thought en
intériorité. Likewise, a singularity may have taken place, in which case it is
an historical singularity that can be thought en intériorité. The name itself
is unnameable, but we can identify the unnameable name by its having
taken place or through its locus. The unnameable recapitulates, in part,
the Derridean notion of  undecidability in that one can never know
absolutely that which is “present” before us. Yet, for Lazarus, there is
an identification of  a locus of  the name that is possible, something
which would be undecidable for Derrida.
But what does it mean to say that a name is unnameable yet
identifiable in that we know it consists (faire consister) of  an intelligible
content through its loci or lieux? Lazarus gives us a concrete example
in the form of  the French Revoluton.12 If  one is to think politics as an
intellectual singularity, it is a name only because it appears as consisting
in and through its having taken place (il a eu lieu). We cannot define
absolutely what politics is, but we can name or identify it in our thought.
The sites or lieux where politics took place (les sans-culottes, Convention,
etc.) may be thought or named as a revolutionary mode of  politics. In
this case the singularity could be thought as the French Revolution.
Lazarus gives the example of  the revolutionary mode of  politics as
concretised in the extended “taking place” of  the French Revolution
between 1792-94. When we examine the sans-culottes and the other
elements that constitute the French Revolution, we see that these
elements are the places or the loci that house the undefinable but
identifiable name of  the category “revolutionary politics”. In other
words, we understand or grasp what politics is in a certain historical
mode not by thinking in abstracto, but through the actual having taken
place of  the events, conventions, personalities, etc. that constitute the
French Revolution. If  we are to think through the nature of
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revolutionary politics, we do so only through the places or loci where
such thought is incarnated, namely, our subjective interiority. In thinking
these singularities, we can identify but not define absolutely what a
revolutionary politics would entail. As we shall see later, the revolutionary
mode of  politics will take on competing definitions for different
historians, each historian lending to the name revolutionary politics
various senses, which in itself  is a political act on the part of  the historian.
This kind of  thinking about historians and their historiographies will
reveal certain singular or nameable definitions and contents of  politics.
To recapitulate, if  we are to think the name “politics” we can
do so in two modes. First, we can think the name of  “politics” as an
intellectual singularity of thought that is localized en intériorité. In this
sense, Lazarus speaks of  politics as having a place (la politique a lieu). In
other words, we can think of  politics within our subjective interiority.
But politics can also be thought in its historical mode. Politics has
taken place in historical events and sequences. La politique a eu lieu. The
fact that we can think of  politics in an historical mode means that
politics has a relation to the real. It is not merely intellectual, but our
thought about politics stems from and is articulated through real
historical events and sequences.13
Time and Politics
Time enters Lazarus’ framework through the identification
of  an historical sequence.14 A certain delimitation happens within a
historical sequence in that it begins and ends. When it begins and when
it ends is always difficult to demarcate. There is an inherent ambiguity
in precise dating.15 We know, for example, that within the sequence
named the French Revolution, the following sequence is possible:
Storming of  the Bastille, execution of  the King, Reign of  Terror.
The beginning and ending of  a sequence may be difficult to
date, especially because we can continue to see the French Revolution
as impacting political thought generaliter. Badiou develops this thought
with his notion of  fidelity. For it established the possibility of  ideals
that continue to have significant impact on French politics and Western
politics in general, especially the nature and roles of  revolution, their
justifications, the possibility of  democratic and freely elected
governments, etc. But Lazarus gives us a clue to help us differentiate
sequences from one another and within themselves. The name that is
given to a certain sequence designates what is singular or peculiar to
that named political thought. One could not claim that the French,
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Russian, Haitian and American “Revolutions” are identical and reducible
to one another.16 These are all different names and possess different
contents but all can be thought in terms of  yielding some insight into
the revolutionary mode of  politics. It should be remarked here that for
Lazarus revolution is a name that properly belongs to the sequence
called French Revolution 1792-94; it denotes specific sites and
intellectualities. The name “Revolution” is loosely applied to the events
mentioned above. Distinguishing various sequences from one another
helps in the determination of  one sequence being distinct from or
irreducible to another intellectual singularity that is experienced in an
historical mode.
Lazarus turns to the historian Marc Bloch to prove his thesis
that thinking politics in its historical mode as an intellectual singularity
does not require the category of  time. For Bloch time is central.17 Why
does time emerge as a central category in relation to history? Time is
central for Bloch because he sees history as emerging from the continuity
and perpetual change that make human beings conscious of  being in
“their times (leurs temps)”.18  In other words, the experience of  living in
certain times and being subject to the events and happenings of  a
certain time as opposed to another time makes people conscious of
the centrality of  the unfolding of  time. History grants access to the
possibility of  investigating human beings “in their times.”
Lazarus sees in Bloch a thinker who tries to give to the
subjective its own priority, mindful of  the fact that subjectivity is not a
thing in itself. Subjectivity also depends on the exterior world for its
content and its being. It is this turn toward the subjective or interior
that permits Lazarus to see in Bloch a thinker who has a similar project
to his nominal anthropology. Hence, Lazarus reads Bloch in order to
show how his project corrects certain excesses of  the Blochian project.
Lazarus takes up Bloch’s text Apologie pour l’histoire in order to
discuss the problematic of  the subjectivation of  time. Bloch sees history
in temporal terms in that it confronts people on two levels, namely, the
subjective and objective.19 Objectively, human beings are in time. They
are subject to a time flow that yields a certain experience of  the past,
present and future. History, objectively speaking, therefore, can be a
study of  the chronology of  events. Subjectively, however, there is an
internal experience of  time that Bloch calls consciousness. We
subjectively experience certain worldly structures in a temporal fashion.
For example, our own inner experience of  the unfolding of  events in
our lives is affected by our inner time consciousness. Some event that
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may have taken three days to unfold chronologically or objectively may
be experienced internally as a shock or a sudden experience that came
out of  nowhere and seemingly had no tangible precursors.  Rather
than oppose subjective and objective time in a dualistic relationship,
Bloch sees time as a multiple operator that gives us multiple senses of
things. He describes time as the source of  the heterogeneous multiplicity
and polysemy of  reality. Time is a multiple operator because it is
experienced as a continuous flow, but within this flow one experiences
changes. It is this flow and the punctuation of  changes that causes
experience and history to be experienced in a multiplicity of  ways and
within a multiplicity of  meanings.20
Caesar conquering Gaul or Luther posting his theses may be
experienced and reinvestigated in the study of  history, but the flow
and change of  time operate on history in that we have a multiplicity of
meanings. For example, how people reacted to Caesar and Luther when
these events were taking place and how we react to them today are
different and different meanings of the conquering of Gaul and the
posting of  the theses continue to evolve. In many ways, there is a
resonance with the Derridean project in that both posit a constant
differentiation of  meanings, but the two thinkers diverge in that
Derridean analysis ends with an undecidability, whereas Bloch claims
that the historian can formalize and make present this heterogeneous
multiplicity through her investigations. Time becomes a locus of
distribution of  multiple meanings.21
Bloch’s project was unique, as Lazarus interprets him, because
he broke away from strictly objectivist views of  history and science as
developed by Durkheim in that he tried to give an account of  the
subjective experience of  reality as being open to historical analysis. But
there is a contradiction in Bloch’s project. On the one hand, Bloch is
an historian and he sees in history the possibility of  giving objective
descriptions of  reality. On the other hand, he wishes to turn to an
investigation of  human interiority and psychology, but he does not
wish to employ the objectivist categories of  the science of  history
stricto sensu.22
How does Bloch resolve this seeming contradiction? In other
words, how can Bloch claim to give to the historical reality of  one’s
interior life its own immanent historical analysis? History becomes an
investigation of  the subjective from “within” and from the “outside”,
and therefore is a science of  the “human being in time.”23 Time becomes
a category that allows one to cross the two realms of  the subjective and
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objective, that is, the domain within the subject and the domain outside
the subject. All of reality is experienced and scientifically analyzed
through the medium of the human subject and the subject becomes
the locus of  two perspectives of  itself, namely, the external and the
internal. The problem of  knowing the external “thing in itself ” is
dismissed in that Bloch turns to the subjective science of  knowing
historically what an external reality is as it is experienced subjectively
and not as a thing in itself existing outside of the subject.
Bloch maintains that duration permits the historian to examine
and conduct his or her science of  history. The constant heterogeneous
multiplicity that time gives as an operator can be seized and grasped
through durations, permitting historical analysis of  the subjective reality
as experienced from within and from without.24 Duration, for Bloch,
allows objects to stand before historical consciousness in order to be
examined. Bloch’s account is based on the simple human experience
of an enduring object of consciousness and the possibility of its being
known and studied.
Bloch has a fractured notion of  time, according to Lazarus. It
is both changing and continuous.25 It is this fractured notion of  time
that gives history its problems. Not only does the chronicling of
historical events become problematic, but so do their historiographical
interpretations. Bloch’s account of  a continuously differentiating sense
of  time would make accounting for a nameable singularity an
impossibility. For Lazarus, a subjective consciousness experiences time
as the unfolding of  a multiplicity of  names or definitions that are
heterogeneous and yet, human consciousness also has the capacity to
give logical and historical consistency to the subjective reality as it is
experienced en intériorité.  But logical consistency does not mean trying
to unify absolutely these names, contents of  thought, and definitions
in an over-arching Unum, making them fixed or absolute. And neither
does it mean creating grand narratives. Thinking is an intellectual process,
and part of  this process consists in making intellectual singularities
intelligible. A logical consistency would produce an awareness that
thought is both multiple and singular. In other words, logic would help
us understand that there is a difference between the singular and the
multiple. History as a science26, for Bloch, would have as its ideal the
reporting and investigation of  this heterogeneous multiplicity that is
made apparent through the fractured sense of  Blochian time. Duration
would allow for such an investigation and reporting. But if  time operates
as constantly differentiating, the singular senses of  history become
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impossible to seize in thought as an enduring intellectual singularity.27
If  we were to accept Bloch’s notion of  history and how time
is central in such a notion, an inconsistency emerges. If  we truly end
up with a constantly differentiating heterogeneous multiplicity, then
any kind of  scientific description of  the multiplicity will be inherently
inadequate because the flow of  time would constantly differentiate
each of  our attempts to describe scientifically and historically what we
have experienced. The radical differentiation or heterogeneity that Bloch
calls for would necessarily make the presentation of  any kind of  scientific
facts impossible. Of  course, this is only true if  we accept Bloch’s view
of  science as objectifying and positivistic, striving to represent that
eternal unity which underlies reality.28
Let us turn to a closer examination of  the above-mentioned
inconsistency. If  time is seen as constantly differentiating and giving us
a heterogeneous multiplicity, this implies that any kind of  repetition of
identical historical analyses would be impossible. Moreover, even if  we
experience duration, the duration itself  consists of  a time flow of
enduring instants—a flow that is subject to the same kind of  radical
differentiation that Bloch sees as vital for his project. A duration does
not stop time even though it claims to be able to extract singularities
from time and bring forth an analysis of  such enduring singularities.
But the moment we allow something to “endure” is the moment that
its being becomes other than what it is. The flow of  time continues to
differentiate the historical object we think we have made endure in
consciousness. The duration obscures the new senses that are emerging
through the differentiation of  the time flow that conditions all of  reality.
For example, if  we were to conduct an historical analysis of  the Gulf
War of  1991 in 1996, and if  we were to claim that such an object can
be studied because of the experience of its intelligibility in consciousness
as an object of  historical analysis, we are not making room for the fact
that the heterogeneous multiplicity that operates on the historical object
in continual time continues to differentiate the definitions or contents
of  the object. The Gulf  War has become laced with many and varied
definitions. Any kind of  description given at a particular time will
necessarily be inadequate as the Gulf  War continues to unfold in time.
In its unfolding, the heterogeneous multiplicity that is the operation of
time renders any enduring historical analysis impossible, for the Gulf
War as an intellectual political and historical singularity continues to
play itself  out. The polysemy of  the Gulf  War continues to unfold.
Not only do the scientific analyses of  history made possible
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through durations come into question because they claim that the
durations are metaphysically present, to borrow from Derrida, but the
possibility of  having any kind of  science called history becomes
questionable. If  Bloch is to be believed and if  time is described as an
operation of  heterogeneous multiplicity, then the attempt to adapt to
the “lignes mêmes du réel”29 becomes questionable.
Lazarus avoids this problem by claiming that the category of
time as an operation of  heterogeneous multiplicity must be eliminated
because of  the inconsistencies it brings to the fore. Lazarus believes
that time in the Blochian sense is not necessary. Apart from the
inconsistencies of  Bloch’s position, Lazarus maintains that if  we were
to return to thought itself  and its subjective interiority, we can analyze
historical and political singularities not only by naming them as does
Bloch in his history, but by examining their loci, thereby making the
Lazarusian notion of  the unnameable name come to the fore. In other
words, if  we turn to Lazarus’ nominal anthropology, time is not
necessary. History becomes a mode in which singularities appear, and
they appear not as heterogeneous multiplicities but as homogeneous
multiplicities.30
Bloch’s problem, according to Lazarus, is that he has collapsed
the distinction between the loci (les lieux du nom) of  the name and the
name itself. The name, as we saw, is a polysemy because it has many
possible meanings, and hence it is ultimately unnameable. But if  we are
to think the name “politics” in the locus of  our interior subjectivities
and as having taken place, we then preserve the distinction between
the thing that is unnameably named and our subjective thinking about
that thing. We do not lapse into a traditionally objectivist treatment of
politics. But the locus of  the name, that is, the subjective interiority of
the name, is something that is peculiar to human subjectivity. The
singular thought or intellectuality that takes place in our subjective
interiority can be thought. Thinking recognizes homogeneous
multiplicity, and we shall see how this is achieved for Lazarus when we
look at his analysis of  the French Revolution.
But this peculiar form of  thinking an intellectuality intelligibly
in our own human subjectivity allows us to at least designate the name
though it remains unnameable. Not only can we designate it but we
can also discuss it. Moreover, this thinking about the intellectual and
political singularity is not a fictio mentis. It is real and concrete because it
draws upon a real historic event. The Gulf  War is not a political fiction.
It happened or it took place (il a eu lieu) and we are still dealing with its
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political and historical consequences today. What emerges in thought,
says Lazarus, is a multiplicity, but the multiplicity is homogeneous.
Homogeneous should not be understood as collapsing the intellectual
singularity housed in our subjectivity into a relation of  identity. All that
is presented in the multiplicity should not be considered to be identical.
Lazarus maintains that if  we examine the historical mode of
various political events, a certain consistency emerges. The consistency
emerges in our subjectivity as stemming from the multiplicity itself
taking place historically and having a place in our own subjectivity.
That is, the consistency of  the singularity that appears in our subjectivity
as having taken place and as being housed in our interiority has a
consistency even though it is multiple.31  The Gulf  War of  1991, though
multiple in definitions and contents, does contain within itself  a certain
consistency. But what does this mean? It means that the Gulf  War is
intelligible as the Gulf  War that took place in 1991 and not in 1234,
and that it includes certain political movements and not others. This is
evidenced when we think about it as an intellectual singularity en intériorité.
Its singularity consists in the fact that it is not reducible to other historical
events. The Gulf  War is not the Coronation of  Charlemagne and its
political significance does not include, for example, a politics of  Teutonic
hegemony. Moreover, the politics emerging from the historical events
surrounding Charlemagne and the Gulf  War of  1991 are not merely
subjective imaginings or fictions. They are external realities upon which
the subjective mind can turn and think but in no way can create absolute.
The category of  Blochian time is abolished for Lazarus because time is
not conceived as an operator or distributor that makes history possible
and the category of  politics does not need time as an operator to be
investigated in its historical mode. The homogeneous multiplicity does
not stem from time itself but from the unnameable name that comes
to appear in thought. But that multiplicity is thinkable precisely because
there is a consistency in it. This consistency or homogeneity, however,
is not to be identified with the unnameable name itself. Rather, it emerges
only through the named event or reality having taken place. The having
taken place of  historical events allows one to think politics concretely,
and the fact that one can think the name that is politics in the locus of
one’s subjectivity en intériorité reveals a possible homogeneity that is
transmittable or able to be investigated. For Bloch, when time is defined
as an operator that yields a heterogeneous multiplicity, any type of
scientific investigation, including an historical investigation, becomes
multiply differentiating. Any kind of  enduring investigative results
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become impossible. At this point, it would be wise to give an example
of  what a Lazarusian non-Blochian view of  time is. Let us turn to the
example of  thinking the political category that emerges when we
examine the French Revolution in its historical mode.
An Example: Thinking the French Revolution Politically
In his essay, “A-propos de la politique et de la terreur,”32 Lazarus
gives us a concrete example of  what it is to think through the name of
politics and what it is to think through the revolutionary mode of
politics. The French Revolution, as most people would common-
sensically concede, is an historical event of  the 18th Century. This means
two things. First, that the French Revolution took place (a eu lieu) and,
second, that it can be thought in the locus (a lieu) of  our subjectivity as
an intellectual singularity. As such, this event can be thought in its
historical mode, albeit to think through the French Revolution in its
historical mode presents certain problems—problems that belong to
the homogeneous multiplicity.33 The first problem is that the French
Revolution occurs before the emergence of  the category of  history as
we know it, that is, the science of  modern history. The second problem
is that it occurs prior to society’s own consciousness of  society being
historical. It is Hegel who raised history to its full objective and cultural
significance, and our very own consciousness of  being historical and
as emerging in history as subjects first comes to be through Hegel’s
writing on history.34 Given the fact that modern historiography follows
the event of  the French Revolution, Lazarus believes that one must
deal with various historiographies in order to think through the name
of  the political that appears in the historical mode of  the French
Revolution. In other words, Lazarus can never escape his own received
legacy of  historical criticism and historiography, which is profoundly
modern in structure. “C’est par conséquent de l’intérieur même de l’historiographie,
de son érudition, et de ses thèses adverses les unes aux autres, que je voudrais ici
développer mon propos.”35 It seems that Lazarus himself  is stuck in a certain
historical time, and he is conscious of  his dilemma, and yet it is
inescapable. One thinks in one’s historical context, in one’s time and
place.
We are immediately faced with a serious problem in Lazarus’
thought. On one hand, he acknowledges that he is fixed within the
historiographies of  his time, which implies an awareness of  time
understood as history. Indeed, he wishes to think from within such
received historiographies. On the other hand, Lazarus will claim that
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time is a category that must be abolished.  Unlike Blochian history,
Lazarusian history is not conceived in temporal terms. Again, history
is a mode of  being, that is, the way a certain intellectual singularity
comes to appear in a certain sequence insofar as that intellectual
singularity is both part of  the sequence and differentiated from every
other singularity in that sequence. History must not be thought as mere
chronology, that is, as living in a certain epoch. For Lazarus and for
Bloch, history is the examination of  the interior life and the mental
states of  the subject. Bloch, however, sees that as conditioned by time,
whereas Lazarus sees it more as a category of  being in relation with
other singularities in a sequence of  thought. For Lazarus, then, to think
the singularity of  the French Revolution “within” the context of
historiography is not to think temporally. That is, the French Revolution
is not an event that should be regarded simply as unfolding in a
chronological fashion based on the flow and precipitation of  certain
events. Rather, the French Revolution must be thought in terms of  the
mental life of  the subjective and what it means for it to be such. Also,
the subjective in question was that of  the participants, especially of
those intellectuals who expressed it most clearly (Lazarus is particularly
keen on Saint-Just.) In this sense, both Lazarus and Badiou insist that
modes of politics can only be apprehended through the thought of
the participants. Hence, his insistence, for example, on reading and
thinking about what Saint Just says.
Given this position, Lazarus wishes to read the event of  the
French Revolution in a particular fashion. He will focus on two specific
elements: the study of  the political capacity of  the French Revolution
and, second, from this perspective, a study of  terror.36 Lazarus
distinguishes his project from that of  a causal historiography.37 Lazarus
looks to thinkers like Furet38, whose revisionist historical treatment of
the French Revolution resulted, according to Lazarus, in a reduction
of  politics to the object of  the state, in order to prove his point. Furet,
drawing from and responding to Marx, ends up depriving the French
Revolution of any of  its political significance. It is reduced to an historical
process.39
Lazarus is confined to a certain type of  historiography, but he
distinguishes himself from other revisionist and “objectifying” historians
by claiming that he necessarily has recourse to history and to historians,
but that he wants to work from within the analyses of  the historians
themselves as opposed to the objective events that the historians are
investigating.40
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Thus far, Lazarus has claimed that the French Revolution is
an historical happening, even though it happened before the formal
category of  history as a modern science emerged. Historiographies
exist about the French Revolution. Lazarus wishes to think within given
singular historiographies in order to think through the political mode
of  the Revolution. Ultimately, Lazarus will show that such
historiographies themselves are political. He will do this by focusing
on various aspects of  the historiographies themselves, including the
dating of  the Revolution.41
Lazarus gives examples of  various historians who have tried
to date the French Revolution.42 The beginning and the end of  the
revolution are questionable. He gives the example of  Aulard, who was
given the Chair of  the History of  the French Revolution at La Sorbonne.
In his book, Histoire politique de la Révolution française, Aulard concluded
that the Revolution was “achieved” (s’achève) in 1804.43 According to
Lazarus’ reading of  Aulard, this is because certain republican conditions
were achieved in that year. Aulard breaks the Revolution down into
various periods, starting with 1789-1792 (constitutional monarchy) and
ending with 1799-1804 (plebiscite republic). This chronology is
punctuated by the periods of  a democratic republic and a bourgeois
republic. Lazarus claims that Aulard is not simply giving an objective
history of  the Revolution. Aulard is seen by Lazarus as giving the French
Revolution a political significance in that the French Revolution is
understood as an evolution of  various forms of  government and various
forms of  the state, ultimately paving the way for the plebiscite republic.
Lazarus describes the plebiscite republic as being Aulard’s view of  the
desirable political state. Aulard, according to Lazarus, operates within
the framework of  an “architectonique à la Montesquieu.”44 Like Montesquieu,
who gives a description of  various political forms, Aulard is read in
much the same light. Lazarus goes on to give other examples of
revolutionary historiographies, including those of  Mathiez45,
Chateaubriand46 and Lefebvre.47 Though space does not permit a formal
examination of  each of  these historiographies, we can see that such
political readings of  historiographies demonstrate the singularity of
the French Revolution as a name that can reveal various modes of
politics. At the same time that we can think, and therefore name, the
French Revolution as a singular event that took place, its meanings are
never fixed or absolute. In this sense, the French Revolution also remains
unnameable.
In his analysis of  the historiographies of  the Revolution,
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Lazarus discovers that politics comes to the fore. The Revolution itself
is not only an historical event, but thinking about the Revolution itself
becomes political. Lazarus himself  offers his own historiographical
reading such that the singularity of  the French Revolution is seen in an
historical mode but it is also seen as showing forth the politics folded
into this very same thinking about the French Revolution. Having shown
how politics comes to the fore in thinking about the historical modes
of  the French Revolution as espoused by various thinkers, Lazarus
claims that the politics he sees as emerging from the French Revolution
is a revolutionary mode of  politics, and this is in contradistinction to
Aulard, who sees a delineation of  various forms of  political organization
that lead to a plebiscite republic.48 More precisely, he sees this mode
coming to show itself  in the sequence that extends from 10 August
1792 to July 1794. “[Elle-la Révolution] est identifiée par les lieux suivants:
Convention, société sans-culottes, clubs, armées de l’an II.”49 For Lazarus, the
revolutionary mode finds its apex in the singularity of  Saint-Just.50
Lazarus goes on to describe in detail what he sees to be the precise
content of  the revolutionary mode, including an inescapable terror of
Robespierre, the role/fate of  Louis XVI, national representation and
ultimately the laws and principles of  a revolutionary government (e.g.,
Saint-Just). To go into detail at this point would be to distract us from
our central concern about Lazarus’ claim about time. It is this claim
that we would like to focus on. We believe we have enough information
about Lazarus’ project that we can now critique Lazarus’ claim
concerning the abolishment of  the category of  time and whether this
is viable or even possible.
Can the Category of  Time Be Abolished?
Lazarus claims to show us how in the analysis of  the
unnameable name called “politics” modo historico a discussion of the
singularity of  an intellectuality can emerge, but only if  we abolish the
category of  Blochian time and its heterogeneous multiplication of
meanings. Lazarus’ critique of  Bloch demonstrates that a science called
history would be unthinkable because of  the heterogeneous
multiplication of  Blochian meanings that would emerge. It would appear
that Bloch is closer to Derrida in that there is a certain impossibility
that colors Bloch’s project, an impossibility that would contradict the
possibility that Bloch sees in his analysis of  enduring singular historical
events. But this seeming affinity between Bloch and Derrida is just
that, namely, a mere appearance. Though both thinkers wish to make
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space for the richness of  multiple meanings that are “within” historical
and political events, Bloch does not structure possibility within a double
bind structure as does Derrida. The Derridean undecidability that flows
from the uncontainable richness of  multiple meanings of  political and
historical events is constituted in the double bind of  the to come and
the différance of  a communicative flow. Though Blochian multiplicity
itself  suggests a differentiation of  meanings, the very classification of
this flow as heterogeneous makes meanings inaccessible or simply
impossible to be thought, whereas Derrida would wish to have the
meanings of  political and historical events temporally structured by
possibility and impossibility. For Derrida, meaning is possible, but it is
impossible to bring it to full presence.
Lazarus’ alternative of  a homogeneous multiplicity allows for
the thinking of  an intellectual singularity as well as for the multiplicity
of  definitions and contents. The Lazarusian language of  an unnameable
name conveys the same force as Derridean undecidability stemming
from the simultaneous playing out of  possibility and impossibility.
Ultimately, can Lazarus make the claims he does without giving some
account of time?
Though Lazarus’ rejection of  the Blochian category of  time
as a heterogeneous multiplier of  meanings can be seen to be valid, can
thought as pensée en intériorité make do without any concept of  time?
The answer to this question is no. A certain sequencing still happens in
thought, albeit a sequencing that is externally given in history. Events
follow from each other in a certain chronology, and it could be said
that the elements in the sequence may affect one another and continue
to do so. Within the name “French Revolution,” for example, one
cannot say that the King was executed in 1792. The elements within
each sequence do have a temporal order as well.
But even if  we were to follow both Bloch’s and Lazarus’ lead
and claim that such chronicling is not all-defining of  the subjective or
interior sense of  political thought, we are still left with the problem of
the subjective intelligibility/interpretation of  sequencing. In his article,
“Dates and Destiny: Deleuze and Hegel”, Jay Lampert remarks,
A date marks a historical event in two ways. It assigns a
singular moment to an event, and it situates events in a
common era. The first function of  the date gives the event
a determinate location relative to other past events and to
the present; the second makes all events available at once
to memory and to interpretation. The first posits events
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in succession; the second posits them in their temporal
coexistence. Both of  these functions of  the date are clearly
genuine phenomena. But insofar as we consider events in
their contemporaneity, their meaning as events in
succession has been removed.51
In bringing together the thought of  Deleuze and Hegel, Lampert shows
how contemporaneity and succession relate. But for Lazarus, the dating
or sequencing happens not because of  the event itself, but because of
the having taken place of  the event and its occupying a place in
subjectivity. This distanciation, according to Lazarus, allows one to think
a given sequence in its interiority as its own singular thought. This
distanciation allows a certain identification or naming of  the unnameable
political event in its historical mode. But is not localization or sequencing
merely dating insofar as a certain ordering of  events plays itself  out?
Even if  localization permits a non-identification with the unnameable
name or the “thing” that is exterior to thought, thereby preserving its
unnameability, one does not erase the problem of  sequencing and how
it implies, as Lampert rightly points out, a certain temporal sequencing.
In his article, Lampert makes the convincing case that dating
something is determined by its destiny. Lampert also takes seriously
the Deleuzian claim of  the radical variability of  dates, noting that dates
are not non-successive but differential. Lampert succeeds in pulling
together a theory of  the date based on his reading of  Deleuze’s Mille
Plateaux.52 What makes dating even more variable and anarchic is the
Deleuzian rhizome. If  we apply Lampert’s and Deleuze’s view of  dating
events, especially as events draw from their fundamental linguistic
articulation as mots d’ordre, to the Lazarusian position, Lazarusian interior
sequencing comes into question. The radical consequence of  Lampert’s
and Deleuze’s position is that events appear in varied and differentiated
sequences. Hence, Lenin can continue to say that the Revolution is
“now.” It would seem that a singular sequence, even if  articulated in
interior thought, would be impossible as a singularity would be
continually undone by the variability and differentialization that happens
in any sequencing of  events. Lazarus would not deny this reality. He
recognizes the radical variability and differentialization in that he
describes the singular as unnameable as well as nameable. Singularities
are unnameable because of  the radical multiplicity and polysemy of
definitions that are folded within. Yet, and at the same time, the
singularity that emerges in this multiplicity and variation is nameable
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because it is thought; naming a singularity is possible and necessary
because of  intellectual work. Previously, we have seen how Lazarus
names the political mode of  French Revolution a “revolutionary.”
Something nameable emerged with the rise of  the unique singularity
of  an event, but it can never be brought to full presence and it can
never be fully named. The sequencing of  historical events implies a
certain dating and, therefore, a certain timing. This sequencing is vital
if  one wishes to name the political modes that emerge from a certain
sequence of  historical events as evidenced by Lazarus’ naming of  the
revolutionary mode of  politics in the historical event called, “The French
Revolution”. Lazarus cannot escape time altogether en intériorité and he
cannot abolish the category of  time.
For both Badiou and Lazarus, politics does not always exist; it
is rare. Both urge us to think politics, either as an event or as a mode.
What is novel about Lazarus’ thought is that he sketches a profound
way to think politics from within. The implications for revolutionary
thought in particular and politics in general is twofold. First, Lazarus
provides a profound critique of  our pragmatist-liberal approach to
politics. We assume that democracy and individual rights, always tied in
with a capitalist economy, is our common base of  understanding and
the very framework within which we do politics. Lazarus asks us to dig
deeper and question this very mode of  liberal political economy. How
does its sequence arise within us and our collective thoughts? We simply
take it for granted, especially in Western politics, that it is the only way
and common sense way of  doing and thinking politics. Second, Lazarus
gives us a concrete method to think politics from within. His nominal
anthropology brings to the fore the fact that politics, what we today
might call political theory, is not merely ancillary but pivotal and central.
Both Badiou and Lazarus want a revolutionary mode of  politics, which
militantly calls for a deep thinking of  the nature of  the political and
how it appears and works. Thinking is foundational in this respect.
I have tried to show that Lazarus cannot abolish time. Badiou
is right to remark that time is central, emerging with the decisive
intervention that brings about both the subject and the event. We have
not only a revolutionary mode of  politics but we have a time of  the
French Revolution that is singular. Though time may not be immediately
or fully present in consciousness or thought, it still operates and is
foundational, perhaps not in the transcendental sense of
phenomenology, but certainly in a deep existential and historical way.
Not having a category of  time in thought runs the risk of  Lazarus
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lapsing into a kind of atemporality that does not yield enough credence
and recognition of  temporal factors, including history, economy, culture,
etc. This is precisely what Horkheimer, Adorno and the critical theorists
tried to show was lacking in philosophy. This is what Badiou tried to
show is indispensable about politics, namely, the subjective political
time that is enfolded in all events or what Lazarus would call
“sequences.”53
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